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	<b>CONFIDENTIAL</b> <b>CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY</b> Office of Congressional Affairs Washington, D.C. 20505 Telephone: 482-6136 17 October 1986
	<b>TO:</b> Mr. Bernie McMahon Select Committee on Intelligence United States Senate Washington, D. C. 20510
<p>Enclosed is the response to the SSCI concerning background to the DCI's speech before the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations. The questions were raised at the 13 August hearing, and we were able to review the transcript in mid-September for all aspects of the issue.</p> <div data-bbox="571 1108 821 1278" style="border: 1px solid black; height: 80px; margin: 10px auto; width: 150px;"></div> <p>Enclosure</p> <p>THIS DOCUMENT IS UNCLASSIFIED WHEN SEPARATED FROM ENCLOSURE</p> <p><b>CONFIDENTIAL</b></p>	

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**CONFIDENTIAL****SSCI Queries of 13 August 1986**

During 13 August 1986 hearings of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, the Chairman, Senator Durenberger, quoted from Mr. Casey's 25 June 1986 address to the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations (SHAFR) and asked, "which World War II experiences demonstrate the success of this kind of resistance theory as applied to Nicaragua?" The extracts that Senator Durenberger quoted were taken from two paragraphs of the published speech:

In my opinion Nicaragua can and should be a perfect example of how some of our experience in World War II can be applied with great effect in support of a resistance movement.... (page 13)

The truth, revealed in our World War II experiences and numerous struggles in the Third World since then, is that far fewer people and weapons are needed to put a government on the defensive than are needed to protect it. A resistance movement does not seek a classic and definitive military victory. External support is almost always a key factor in resistance success. A progressive withdrawal of domestic support for a government accompanied by nagging military pressure largely against economic targets is what helps bring down or alter a repressive government. (page 14)

In the discussion following Mr. Clair George undertook to have the Agency respond to Senator Durenberger's question about the relevance of World War II resistance experience today, and Senator Bradley's request for "a little historical analogizing" on the subject. Although Mr. Casey also refers to Third World struggles since 1945, we shall focus on the subject of his address and of the two senators' questions, the resistance in World War II. We are confident, however, that the last 40 years of violence would yield

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even richer evidence to support the contentions quoted above, in such events as the Chinese Civil War, a host of national insurgencies against colonial rule, Castro's rise in Cuba, the long U.S. involvement in Indochina, and the overthrow of the Shah in Iran.

Although there is no exact parallel to today's situation in Nicaragua (or in Afghanistan, Angola or anywhere else) in the history of some earlier resistance movement, we are convinced that US policymakers should look at historical situations that seem to have significant elements in common with today's problems. Since all analogies are limited, differences as well as likenesses must be taken into account when we look for insight from historical analogies. In their recent book, Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision Makers, Ernest May and Richard Neustadt wisely counsel against invoking historical analogies as a substitute for thinking hard about things as they are. Close analysis of the situation at hand has to precede the search for possibly relevant historical analogies.

Since Mr. Casey's 25 June address to SHAFR largely focused on the World War II resistance movement in France, we should consider how far that experience supports his generalizations quoted above. Before the Normandy landings in June 1944 the French resistance had both undermined the viability of Marshal Petain's collaborationist regime and confronted the Nazi occupation forces with an increasingly hostile populace. Although the French resistance never sought a military victory on its own, by 1944 the Vichy regime was so discredited that its survival depended upon the arms of the Nazi German occupying power. External support was a key factor in the success of the French resistance, which looked to General DeGaulle's Fighting

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French in London and Algiers and to British and American intelligence organizations for leadership and all kinds of assistance.

While World War II France illustrates how a relatively small and lightly-armed resistance movement helped undermine a repressive government, there are nevertheless a number of important differences between Nazi-occupied France and the situation in Nicaragua today. The French resistance was principally formed and directed against the German army in France, and not simply against the collaborationist Vichy government. Well before D-Day Allied military success meant that the French resistance could look forward to--and organize themselves to support--an Anglo-American cross-channel attack that would liberate France and defeat Germany. It was during and after this invasion that the French resistance made its most important contribution, which General Eisenhower assessed as equivalent to 15 divisions.

World War II was not won by the resistance, in France or anywhere else. Although Tito's Partisans, with external support but without the help of invading Soviet or western forces, drove the German army out of Yugoslavia, no occupied country can truly be said to have liberated itself from the Axis powers independently of the success of the Allied arms. Yet World War II resistance movements, both in Europe and the Far East, demonstrate how much small and lightly-armed forces, with a modicum of external support, can accomplish against both foreign occupation armies and domestic quisling regimes.

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